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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GAYLE SOUTH ARGYLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
ARTHUR MITCHELL ARGYLE,

Case No. 19ll0

Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted plaintiff a divorce, custody of a minor
child,

$350 per month for the support of the minor child, items of

property then in her possession, a cash settlement of $463,000 in lieu
of all other property rights, to be paid $100, 000 within six months from
January 6, 1983, and the balance of $363 ,000 to be paid over a 15-year
period together with interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of 10%
percent per annum, defendant to pay 15 equal annual installments of
$·11. 138 05

each,

including

principal and interest and $2, 000 as an

dtturney's fee, plus costs of court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON Al'l'EAL
Appellant seeks reverc,a\ of the judgment and remand to the lr1al
court for a determination of the value of the assets owned by appellant
and entry of a decree that is equitable.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married on September 29, 1955, and
lived together as husband and wife in Randolph, Utah, until November
1982, when plaintiff moved to Evanston, Wyoming (Tr. 9).

The parties

had five children, all but one of whom had reached their majority at the
time of trial (Tr

10).

The appellant, Arthur Argyle, had been a rancher all his life and
was employed by Argyle Ranch, Inc.

(Tr.

132).

The ranch had been

established by his father and had been operated by his father until his
death in 1949.

At that time, management of the ranch was taken over

by Arthur's mother,

Emma Ireta Argyle (Tr.

184).

She operated the

ranch with the help of her sons until September 1963, at which time she
decided to take steps to keep the ranch in the family.

She made a gift

to

property

Arthur

and

his

brother

Ralph

Argyle

of

some

contributed by them to a new corporation in exchange for stock.
mother,

in

exchange for

stock,

to

be
The

con trihu ted some 2. 700 acres of real

property, livestock, machinery. person;d property and eq u1pmen t
For the real property g-i\'en t•J Arthur and Ralph by their motht'r
and subsequently transferred to the corporation. each 0f the brothers

- 2 -

received 10, 000 shares of stock in Argyle Ranch, Inc. , having a par
value

of

$1. 00

"Agreement

to

per

share.

Incorporate

At
and

the same time,
Declaration

and as part of an
of

Gift"

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit 5), Arthur received 18 ,000 shares as a gift and Ralph received
18, 000 shares as a gift.

A total of 73, 000 shares was issued to her.

The mother agreed to sell to each of her two sons 3, 000 shares per
year at a par value of $1. 00 per share for a total of five years, so that
after that period each of them, Arthur, Ralph, and Emma Ireta, would
own 43, 000 shares.

As a device to keep the corporation in the Argyle

family, the agreement contained the following provision:
5.
In the event that any of the parties to this
agreement desire to sell their shares of stock in said
corporation they shall first give notice of their intention so to
do to the remaining parties, who shall have 30 days within
which to exercise the option to purchase the withdrawing
parties' or party's shares of stock, which shall be sold and
purchased at par value. The parties agree that they will not
offer stock they desire to sell to any other party until the
remaining shareholders of stock have had the opportunity of
exercising the option to purchase said stock.
Notice of
intention to sell shall be given in writing.
6.
The terms of the sale shall be upon the payment of
10% of the par value of the stock sold per year, plus 3%
interest, with the payments to commence 12 months from the
date of the exercising of the option to purchase.
7
On the death of EMMA IRET A the remaining
partners or partner, as the case may be, are hereby given
an option to purchase the shares of stock held by said EMMA
IRET A, at par value, in 10 annual installments, plus
interest, each commencing 12 months after the death of said
EMMA !RETA. and on the same day of each year thereafter
until said stock has been purchased at the par value thereof,
and the purchaser or purchasers of the stock of said EMMA
I RETA shall have the option to pay at any accelerated rate
they may choose.
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The agreement was signed by Emma lreta Argyle, Arthur Mitchell
Argyle, Ralph Evan Argyle, and the respondent herein, Gay IP 1\r'gyle
The option was

put into the agreement because of Emma's fear that

someone might want to pull out or to try and hold another partner up
for too much money (Tr. 185).

Emma continued active in managment of the company until about
1975,

when she first became incapacitated,

Upon her death,

her sons,

following which she died.

Ralph and Arthur, enforced the buy-sell

agreement as against her estate (Tr.

186).

Since its execution,

the

agreement has not been modified in any respect (Tr. 186, 187)
Arthur had been vice-president of the corporation, but upon the
death of his mother six years ago,

he became acting president.

He

then owned 43, 000 shares and Ralph owned 43, 000 shares of the total of
129,000 shares outstanding (Tr. 133)
As with the herders and other employees of the ranch, Arthur has
been furnished with a home, board, utilities, and a vehicle to be used
in connection with ranching operations.

At the time of trial, he was

drawing a salary of $200 to $300 per month, and the ranching company
was paying $1, 100 a month to Gayle to help Arthur meet the obligations
of a temporary order (Tr. 146).

There was no evidence as to the basis

for this advance by the ranching company,

, whether it was to be

repaid as a loan, or whether there was to he some adiustment made in
the relative shareholdings of Ralph and Arthur
he owns in the corporation,
the house (Tr. 147).

Exceµt for the sh;ires

Arthur's unly assets 3n· a frw things in
- 4 -
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Although Gayle signed a deed in 1963 by which the property of
Arthur and Ralph was conveyed to the corporation, the property had
been

conveyed

in

the first instance by Emma Ireta to Arthur and

Ralph, not to Gayle (Tr. 60).

During the years of the marriage, Gayle

did work on the ranch, worked in a restaurant, and performed duties
as a housewife.

When her father died in 1976, Gayle signed papers so

that her mother would receive all of his holdings, Gayle giving up any
right she had in the estate (Tr. 55).

One of the properties that came

down from her father was a timber company, for which she was working
at the time of the trial (Tr. 56).
Mark Crystal, an appraiser, was employed by Gayle to determine
the market value of the assets owned by Argyle Ranch, Inc. (Tr. 68).
Over objection to his testimony on the ground that it did not relate to
the value of the shares owned by Arthur, Crystal testified that the
market value of the ranch was $3 ,489, 249, but this did not take the
company's debt into account (Tr. 130).

He admitted that the values

given would be more useful for liquidation of the corporation over a
period of years (Tr. 118), the valuation having been based upon the
valuation of the various pieces of property that comprised the ranch,
by a comparable sales method, and the valuations of items of equipment,
and livestock (Tr. 74-113)
the value of the stock.

Mr. Crystal made no attempt to appraise

This was out of his field (Tr. 131).

Using a different method of valuation, Richard T. Huffman, a real
estate broker, land use consultant, and appraiser valued the ranch at
$2, 235, 500 (Tr. 208), less the amount of the indebtedness, which was
approximately $1,300,000 (Tr

169).
- 5 -
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Financial

statements

prepared

by

Argyle

Ranch,

Inc ,

for

the

Production Credit Administration were admitted in evidence as plamtiff's
Exhibit 6, and defendant's Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9.
dated December 2,

1982,

The most recent,

showed total assets of $2, 992, 855 and total

liabilities of $1,030,847, leaving a net worth of $1,962,008 (defendant's
Exhibit 6),

but

there

was

testimony

that

additional

debt

had

been

incurred since the date of the statement.
The court ignored the testimony of both of the experts and found
the value of the

assets of the

corporation to be $1, 962, 008. 00,

exact sum set out in financial statment of December 2, 1982.

the

Although

there was no finding, as such, with respect to value, in its Conclusion
of Law No. 4 the court stated:
That plaintiff shall be awarded a cash settlement in lieu of all
other property rights except as set forth in paragraphs 2 and
3 hereof, in the sum of Four Hundred Sixty Three Thousand
Dollars ($463, 000), rep res en ting one-half of the value in the
defendant's stock in the Argyle Ranch, Inc., this sum being
based upon the assets of Argyle Ranch, Inc. , which form the
basis for the value of the stock in Argyle Ranch, Inc. , the
net value of said assets being $1, 962, 008. 00, from which is
deducted the sum of $109, 000, representing a gift of land
received from defendant's mother; the balance of this then
being divided by one-half, which is the defendant's interest
in Argyle Ranch, Inc.
This balance is then divided in half,
representing plantiff's interest in the property accumulated
and included in the marital estate. The sum of One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) being payable to plaintiff from
defendant within six (6) months from January 6, 1983, with
the balance of said sum of $363, 000. 00 being payable to
plaintiff from defendant over a fifteen ( 15) year period,
together with interest on the unpaid balance of $363, 000 00
from August 6, 1983, payable as follows
The sum of $363, 000 00, together with interest
on the unpaid balance thereof at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum, said interest beginning
on August 6, 1983, shall be paid in 15 equal annual

- 6 -
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installments of $4 7, 738. 05 each, including principal
and interest, and the first of said payments shall
be due and payable on or before August 6, 1984,
and a like payment of $47, 738. 05 shall be due on
the 6th day of August each and every consecutive
year
thereafter
until
the
entire
amount
of
$363,000.00, together with accrued interest thereon,
shall be paid in full. All payments shall apply first
to interest and second to the reduction of principal.
During

final

argument,

the

court

conceded

that

the

buy-sell

agreement between Ralph and Arthur was valid (Tr. 296), but there
was no finding as to the effect of the agreement upon the valuation of
the stock owned by Arthur,

indeed there was no finding as to the

valuation of his stock except as set out in the above conclusion.
The corporate tax returns of Argyle Ranch, Inc., show that its
taxable income for 1977 was $3, 702. 95 (defendant's Exhibit 10), for 1978
was

$21,157.49

(defendant's

(defendant's

Exhibit 12),

Exhibit 11),

and

for

1980

for
was

1979

was

$25, 702

$32,019.03
(defendant's

Exhibit 13)
The tax returns of Arthur and Gayle Argyle show that they had a
taxable income in 1977 of $6, 575. 40 (defendant's Exhibit 14), in 1978 of
$10,793

(defendant's

Exhibit 15),

in

1979

of $9,354.80 and in 1980

$11,024.76 (defendant's Exhibit 17).

ARGUMENT

THERE
WAS
NO EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT
A MONEY
JUDGMENT AGAINST ARTHUR ARGYLE IN THE AMOUNT OF
$463, 000, OR ANY OTHER AMOUNT.

- 7 -
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There was testimony from three experts, Mark Cry st al, Hichard T
Huffman,
Ralph
Ranch,
worth

and Blaine Davis Hales,

Argyle
Inc.
of

witnesses,

concerning

the

and from

values

of

Gayle

the

Argyle and

assets

held by

from

Argyle

There were also financial statements indicating the net

the

corporation

however,

from

1978

through

1982

None

of

the

testified as to the value of the stock owned by

Arthur Argyle in Argyle Ranch, Inc. , and it was not shown by any of
the exhibits .
It is undisputed that Argyle Ranch, Inc. , is a corporation, that

the stock is held equally by Ralph Argyle and Arthur Argyle, that each
of them owns 43, 000 shares of stock in the corporation, that they are
presently purchasing from the estate of Emma Ireta Argyle an additional
21, 500 shares each, and that approximately $20, 000 is still owed to the
estate for the stock.
Faced with some complex but insufficient evidence, the court took
the easy way out.
the

corporation

It looked at the most recent financial statement of

(defendant's

Exhibit 9)

fixed

its

gaze

on

the

"net

worth" line, interpreted the net worth as the value of the corporation
assets, and decided that the value of the corporation was $1, 962, 008.
It deducted from this sum $109,000 representing the value fixed on the

property conveyed to the corporation in 1963 by Emma Ire ta Argyle,
apparently taking the view that this property was not marital proper\\'
because it was a gift to the husband, but giving to the wife credit for
20 years appreciation.

After deduction of the $109, 000 the v:due of the

corporation's assets was fixed at $1,853,008, and the valuP uf Ar·thur

- 8 -
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Argyle's interest in the corporation at $926 ,504.

The court divided this

amount equally and entered a money judgment in favor of the wife for
$463,252.
The

only

virtue

in

this

ruling was its simplicity.

The court

assumed, without any evidence, that the value of Arthur Argyle's stock
in

Argyle Ranch,

Inc.,

was equal to one-half of the value of the

underlying assets, less the debt.

It was not asked to,

and did not

indicate that it intended to, take judicial notice that the value of stock
in

a

closely

held family

corporation

is

equal to

the

value of the

properties held by the corporation less the indebtedness owed by the
corporation.

Moreover,

even

if

the court had been asked to take

judicial notice of such a fact, it would not have been permitted to do
so.

How the stock of a particular corporation in a particular setting at

a particular year is to be valued is not a matter of common knowledge,
and it is not a specific fact or proposition of generalized knowledge
which is capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to
easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.

See Rule 9, Utah

Rules of Evidence.
Not only

did

the

court fix a value of the stock without any

evidence of its value, it gave no consideration to the fact that Arthur
Argyle's stock was subject to an option exercisable by Ralph Argyle to
purchase the stock for $1.00 per share for Arthur's 62,500 shares, if
Arthur wanted to sell it.
The agreement was entered into long before any dispute arose
between the parties in this case.

The architect of the agreement was

- 9 -
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Emma

lreta

Argyle,

the mothec ,_,f Ralph

and

Arthur

Argyle

The

plaintiff, Gayle Argyle, was completely aware of the agreement at the
time it was entered into.

Indeed, she participated in it by signing off

any interest she might have had in the property being contributed by
Arthur, and by signing the agreement herself.
Such

agreements,

particularly

when

entered

into

under

the

circumstances that this agreement was entered into, are held to be valid
and binding.
In re Estate

Mather, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A. 2d 586 (1963), involved

an agreement containing the following provision:
2.
That in the event of the death of Gilbert Mather,
or in the event of his offering his stock for sale during his
life, he, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators,
agrees to sell, and Victor C. Mather and Charles E. Mather,
II agree to buy, in equal proportions, at One Dollar ($1. 00)
per share, any or all of the common stock holdings of the
said Gilbert Mather.
4.
That as to any or all of the above three provisions,
the survivors or survivor among the class of purchasers in
each case shall be entitled to the entire rights given the
purchasers in each case.
When Victor C. Mather died his executor sold his stock to Gilbert
and Charles Mather for $1. 00 per share

When Gilbert died in 1959,

Charles

for

II

tendered

$501

to

his

estate

501 shares of stock in the company

the

purchase

of

his

At the time of the tender, the

stock of Mather and Company was carneJ on the books at $-t-t-t. 9'.2 and
its actual value was not less than $1. 060 per share

The tender was

refused and action was brought to enforce the ag-reement.
court did.
- 10 -
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After quoting from a prior Pennsylvania case to the effect that
such agreements are not contrary to any overruling public policy, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:
The aforesaid written agreements, including the one in
suit, were made between mature members of a close family and
it is conceded that there was no overreaching or fraud or
deceit.
The facts and the lawfulness of the purpose were
admitted by appellants.
However, appellants argue that the
agreement was an invalid restraint on alienation because the
price was clearly very unfair and unchangeable.
The
contention that a stock option or purchase price must be
flexible is unrealistic and utterly devoid of merit, even if we
overlook the fact that the price was not unchangeable since in
1939 the parties entered into the present written agreement
changing the price on the option purchases and sales from
$50. 00 to $1. 00. Moreover, we repeat, the agreement clearly
and expressly set forth the intention of all the parties -they wanted to keep the family business in the Mather family
and to give each other and their personal representatives the
options, rights and obligations hereinabove recited.
In
this free land of ours where even a state cannot impair the
obligations of a contract, we cannot understand how it can be
seriously contended that this written family agreement -- and
family agreements are always favored in the law -- when made
by adult businessmen without any overreaching or fraud, is
"a scrap of paper." [Emphasis by court.] 189 A. 2d at 590.

***

Another

buy-sell agreement

was

involved

in

Jones

v.

63 Wash. 2d 559, 388 P. 2d 539, 541-42 (1964), in which there was an
obligation to sell stock at a price substantially less than its value.
Repulsing an attack on the agreement, the Supreme Court of Washington
said:

* * * The

contract cannot be said to have been unfair or
inequitable when it was made, and now it is too clear to admit
of
interpretation- to include
and
emphasize
equities,
non-existent at the inception of the contract, but which have
evolved and now seem persuasive. Many close corporations
have similar buy-out provisions, and the courts would do a
disservice to business practice by substituting an "appraisal"

- 11 -
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or "market value" formula when hindsight shows that "book
value," as originally conceived,
become unrealistic with
the passing of time.
Other cases upholding similar agreements are Georesearch, Inc. v.
Morriss,

193 F.Supp.

Inc.

Twining,

v.

and Arentsen v.

163, 173 (W.D.

La.

1961); Cutter Laboratories,

221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 34 Cal. Rptr.

317, 325 (1963),

Sherman Towel Service Corporation, et al.

352 Ill.

327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933).

The validity of the Argyle buy-sell agreement was upheld by the
District Court of Rich County in The Matter <2.f the Estate <2.f Emma Ireta
Mitchell Argyle, also known as Emma Ireta Argyle, Deceased (Probate
No. 433), of which the court took judicial notice.
Appellant is not arguing that the court is bound to value the stock
at $62, 500 (less the $10, 000 still owed), but he does argue, rightfully,
that the court was required to take the stock purchase agreement into
consideration.
Suther
involved

v.

the

proceeding.

Suther,

valuation

of

28 Wash. App.
corporate

838,

627 P. 2d

110

(1981),

stock in a marriage dissolution

The court pointed out that valuation of shares of a closely

held corporation presents a difficult prnblem calling for the weighing of
relevant facts
quoted

the

and ultimate exercise of

following

from

Lavene

v

392 A.2d 621, 623-24 (1978)

- 12 -
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Valuation of stock in a closely held company is an
attempt to determine the fair market value of an asset which
by definition does not have a fair market value, since a
ma_rket wherein a willing buyer will meet a willing seller,
neither under a compulsion, generally does not exist. The
stock of a closely held corporation is as a rule offered for
sale only under unusual circumstances.
The number of
prospects is usually extremely limited.
[Tierney, "A New
Approach to the Valuation of Common Stock of Closely Held
Companies," Journal
Taxation 14 (July 1962).]
As a result, the valuation of the stock of a closely held
corporation requires an entirely different approach than the
valuation of any other asset. The valuation process has been
described as a "matter of judgment and opinion rather than
mathematics."
Banks,
"Present
Value and the Close
Corporation", 49 TAXES
The Tax Magazine, 33, 35
(January 1971).
Each case presents a unique factual
question, the solution to which is not within the ambit of any
exact science.
The reasonableness of any valuation depends
upon the judgment and experience of the appraiser and the
completeness of the information upon which his conclusions
are based.
La winger, "Appraising Closely Held Stock -Valuation Methods and Concepts," llO Trusts and Estates 816
(October 1971). Suther, 627 P.2d at 112-ll3. --After reviewing a number of cases dealing with the question, the
Washington court concluded that although a buy-sell agreement is not
necessarily determinative of a stock's value, a buy-sell agreement is a
factor to be considered.
In re Marriage of Rosan,

24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295,

299 ( 1972), the trial court determined stock value by applying a formula
in a buy-sell agreement and on appeal this was upheld, the appellate
court observing that such conditions on disposition of the stock and its
resulting

illiquidity

are factors

which substantially affect its value.

The right of Ralph Argyle to purchase the shares of Arthur Argyle for
$1 00 per share is certainly a factor that would effect the liquidity of

- 13 -
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the asset of Arthur Argyle and would affect the value of his stock m
Argyle Ranch, Inc.
A divorce proceeding is equitable in nature and this court may
review

both

the

law

Constitution; Read v.

and

the

facts.

Article VIII,

Section 9,

Read, 594 P. 2d 871, 872-873 (Utah 1979)

Utah
And

where the evidence is insufficient to support a trial court's valuation of
a husband's interest in a corporation, the finding must be reversed.
Christensen, 529 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Colo.App. 1974)

II
ENTRY OF A MONEY JUDGMENT FOR $463, 000, WITH
$100,000 PAYABLE WITHIN SIX MONTHS, AND THE BALANCE
TO DRAW INTEREST AT TEN PERCENT PER ANNUM WAS AN
ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION.
The evidence in this case was that the corporation's equity/debt
ratio was about one to one or at most two to one, and that financial
institutions,
generally

in

considering

whether

to

lend

money

to

corporations

require an equity/debt ratio of four or five to one.

The

evidence was also to the effect that Argyle Ranch, Inc. , has a heavy
burden in servicing its present debt and that its borrowing capacity
beyond that necessary for maintenance of the ranching operations is
limited.

Disposition of assets

with corresponding liabilities would be

disastrous.
The evidence is also to the effect that except for his housing and
food

and utilities and trans portion,

Arthur

Argyle draws \·er·y little

from the corporation, $200 to $300 a month in addition to the $1, 100 pi.:r
- 14 -
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month he has had to obtain during the pendency of the action to pay to
his

wife.

Given

the financial condition of the corporation and the

financial condition of Arthur Argyle, one cannot help but wonder how
the trial court would expect him to be able to meet the terms of the
judgment unless he were able to convince the other shareholder, Ralph
Argyle,

that

the

corporation

should

be

liquidated

and

its

assets

distributed.
In Phillips

Phillips,

171 Colo.

127, 464 P. 2d 876 (1970), the

husband's assets consisted of interests in partnerships, stock in nine
local corporations, and some solely owned property.

The trial court, in

lieu of a property division, awarded the wife cash in the amount of
$400, 000, of which $100, 000 was to be payable within one month of the
date of the

decree and the balance in installments of $12, 000 every

three months,

with interest payable quarterly at the rate of 5% per

annum upon the deferred balance; $1, 050 per month for the support of
three children; $250 alimony plus another $250 for any month that the
husband might be delinquent, payment by the husband of all unpaid
family accounts, and payment of the fees of attorneys, appraisers and
accountants .
On

appeal

the

court

found

that

the

testimony of

appraisers

justified the award of $400,000 and the $1,050 per month child support
and the $250 per month alimony, but it reversed the trial court because
of the method required for payment of the award.
suggested

that

the

trial

problems presented by

court

had

an

obligation

The Supreme Court
to

toil

with

the

the rather studied expressions by competent
- 15 -
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appraisers and certified public account;rnts relating to the values of the
marital property.

In disapproving the court's requirement as to the

methods of payment of the cash award, the court said
The nature of a substantial part of the solely owned property
of Mr. Phillips was such that it could not be liquidated
quickly. The court found as follows:
"[Mr. Phillips'] interest in the corporations and
partnerships * * * cannot by reason of the nature
of those businesses be immediately liquidated. Any
attempt at an immediate liquidation would seriously
impair [Mr. Phillips'] valued interest in the same."
We have been unable to find anything in the record
disputing Mr. Phillips' testimony that, if he were compelled to
sell or liquidate a substantial portion of his interests, he
would be bankrupt.
We have already noted the aggregate
indebtedness of $6, 370, 000. It appeared that the enterprises
in which Mr. Phillips had fractional interests had inadequate
working capital.
This,
combined with the tremendous
liabilities, place Mr. Phillips in a position in which it would
be difficult to borrow and disastrous to have forced
liquidations.
We are in agreement with his position that the
order requiring payment of $100, 000 within a month and
$12,500 each quarter upon the remaining sum of $300,000 was
confiscatory and an abuse of discretion. 464 P. 2d at 879-80.
The

court

also disapproved of the allowing of interest on

the

unpaid portions of the $400,000 and the $250 penalty for late payment
of alimony.
In Matter c:>[ Babb and Babb, 30 Ore. App. 581. 567 P 2d 599, 602
( 1977), the court, among other things, awarded the wife a lump sum of
$30,000 at 7% interest

In disallowing the interest. the appellate court

said:
We agree that the interest pro\·ision will pla··" an undue
financial burden on the husband and should be removed
1t
is true, as the wife argues, the payment scht·dul" pro\'tdt·s

- 16 -
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for minimum payments and husband may reduce the interest
liability by making larger payments. However, the assets of
the parties are largely non-liquid and husband would either
have to borrow money to pay a substantial payment and incur
additional interest expense or utilize a large portion of his
monthly income in order to reduce the interest obligation.
In the instant case, the court is requiring a payment of $100,000
within six months of its announcement from the bench of its decision,
and the payment over 15 years of $363,000 at 10% interest.

There was

nothing in the evidence which would justify a conclusion by the trial
court that the husband in this case would have any way of coming up
with $100, 000 in six months or that he would be able to pay the sum of
$363, 000, or that he would even be able to meet the interest burden.
At 10% per annum, the interest on $363,000 is $36,300 a year or $3,025
per month.

The principal payments, if not amortized, would amount to

$24, 200 per year for the 15-year period provided in the decree.

By

the terms of the decree the amount that the husband will have to pay
over the 15-year period comes out at $716,070. 75.
Instead of seeking an easy (for the court) solution, the court
should have grappled with the problems presented by the illiquidity of
Argyle Ranch,

Inc. , by the corporate debt, and the profitability or

unprofitability of the corporation, by the buy-sell agreement, and by
the equal division of control of the corporation.
The court also abused its discretion in not taking into account the
full value of the property conveyed to the corporation, as a gift to her
sons,

b)'

Emma Ireta

contributed cit

the

Argyle.

It

took only the value of the assets

time of incorporation,
- 17 -
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values.

It did not consider the 18 ,000 shares given to l\rthur by his

mother.

This was true even though the wife, who had some lilheritance

(though she didn't know how much) had voluntarily relinquished her
rights so that all of her father's property could go to her mother.

The

court, of course, can take into consideration property owned by the
husband even when its acquired by a gift, but under the circumstances
here, the award to the wife was excessive.

CONCLUSION

The wife had the burden of proving the value of the husband's
assets

to

be

included

in

the

marital

estate.

primarily of 43, 000 shares of stock in
right

to

acquire

additional

an

$10 ,000,

additional

his

rights

the

assets consisted

Argyle Ranch,

21,500 shares
in

His

stock

Inc. , and the

upon

payment

of

an

being

subject

to

an

agreement entered into in 1963 giving to him and his brother Ralph the
right to buy the shares of the other, if sold, at a price of $1. 00 per
share.
The wife failed
shares.
assets,

to put on any evidence as to the value of the

Her only evidence was as
considered

piecemeal.

The

to

the

value of

financial

the underlying

statements

of

Argyle

Ranch, Inc. , relied upon by the trial court. do not reflect the value of
the stock owned by Arthur Argyle.
In arriving at the value of the stock the court should have taken
into consideration the effect of the buy-sell agreement

- 18 -

Even assuming that the court's valuation is correct, which is a
difficult assumption, the cash award as made by the court was unfair
and confiscatory, well beyond the ability of the husband to pay.

On

the evidence before the court the only way that he would be able to
pay it would be to have the corporation dissolved and its assets sold,
and he cannot force that.

The corporation's borrowing capacity is not

sufficient to assist the husband as a shareholder in this regard, and
neither are its profits.
The court having made a finding not supported by the evidence
and having abused its discretion in the method of making a cash award,
the case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings, to determine the value of the stock and to arrive at a just
and equitable method for awarding to the wife a fair share of the
property acquired through the joint efforts of the couple.
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